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aving been involved in the discussions 
preceding the establishment of the 
OECD/DAC criteria as member of the DAC 
Working Party on International Development 
Cooperation Evaluation (IDCE) representing 
the European Commission, it is understandable 
that I have read Chianca’s (2008) article with 
exceptional interest. There is hardly anything in 
this article that I would disagree with, except a 
few minor aspects that I will mention in due 
course. I also fully support the idea of taking a 
critical look at the DAC criteria and at IDCE 
approaches in general, a critical review that 
should always continue as an ongoing process. 
“If followed,” Chianca says the changes he 
proposes “could contribute for increasing the 
quality of evaluation for the purposes of . . . 
decision options” (p. 1). I will try to formulate 
some proposals with a view to bringing that “If 
followed” premise a bit closer to reality. My 
comments have been written with the contents 
of my article, “Planning and Evaluation, Two 
Sides of the Same Coin,” in mind and should be 
understood in that context. (Eggers, 2006). 
The author lists the five DAC criteria of 
Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact, 
and Sustainability together with their DAC 
definitions and underlines that they represent 
remarkable progress compared with the time 
preceding their establishment. That is certainly 
true considering the set of criteria that was then 
in use (and is, according to the author, “still 
quite preponderant” today!); to wit, “measuring 
outputs, monitoring resources’ application and, 
where more sophisticated, estimating a project’s 
economic rate of return” (Chianca, 2008, p. 44). 
Well, that reminds me of the difference between 
the dark ages and Enlightenment and, after so 
many years, I am still proud of the contribution 
the DAC Working Party made in that respect. 
But can the result of our work be further 
improved? Of course it can, and it should! 
A task force of ten professionals, all 
pursuing doctoral degrees in evaluation at 
Western Michigan University, reviewed the 
DAC criteria and reach these conclusions: 
 
(a) Meeting the needs of the targeted 
population should be the top priority. 
(b) The effectiveness criterion should be refocused 
on “impact” instead of “goals.” 
(c) The criterion of sustainability should make 
reference not only to future but also to 
“retrospective” sustainability and include, 
besides environmental and financial aspects, 
political support, cultural appropriateness, 
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adequacy of technology, and institutional 
capacity.  
(d) Efficiency should cover not only monetary 
but also nonmonetary costs, include 
comparisons with alternative solutions and 
not be limited to defining the least costly 
approach (“cost-effectiveness” appears to 
be a better term). (Chianca, 2008) 
 
I agree unreservedly on point (a) above, 
both as to the substance and as to the wording 
(terminology). I also agree on the substance of 
points (b), (c), and (d), but I think that the 
terminology has to be reviewed. It is important 
to keep substance and terminology strictly apart. 
What matters first and foremost, of course, is 
substance. How to convey the substance with 
adequate terms is strictly a matter of convention 
and in no way alters the substance. But 
conventions, once established, should be 
adhered to if there are no convincing reasons to 
change. The bottom-up chain of effects in 
classical “logical framework analysis” has always 
been this: inputs, outputs (or results), outcome 
(or “project/program/policy (PPP) purpose” or 
“specific objective”), goal (or wider objective). 
Acquiring lowest cost inputs is called 
“economy”; transforming inputs into outputs in 
the most rational manner is called “efficiency”; 
transforming outputs into outcome that meets 
the needs of the target group is called 
“effectiveness”; and the contribution of the 
intervention to the next higher PPP level, i.e. to 
the goal or “wider objective,” is called “impact.” 
Maintaining benefits during a prolonged period 
without international assistance is called 
“sustainability.” Readers who have the 
traditional terminology in mind will thus find it 
very difficult to understand, for instance, the 
statement that “the definition of effectiveness 
focuses on determining the extent to which the 
intervention met its goals” (Chianca, 2008, p. 
45). The confused reader will also balk at the 
idea of replacing “efficiency” with “cost-
effectiveness,” because this last expression 
reaches in one go from inputs to outcome. 
What advantage does that have, and why should 
the much clearer and logical linking of inputs to 
outputs and of outputs to outcomes be 
abandoned in favour of an expression that 
advances confusion rather than clarity? That 
confusion would not exist if we could all agree 
on a common terminology, and as long as it is 
not demonstrated that there are convincing 
reasons in favour of changing the traditional 
terminology that terminology should be 
maintained. I know what your immediate 
reaction to the above statements will be, dear 
task force! It will be that I have not understood 
that the substance you want to cover by each of 
these terms does not fit the traditional meaning 
and that this is important because otherwise 
these areas of substance are left uncovered. You 
will point out, for instance, that “efficiency” 
should cover not only monetary but also 
nonmonetary costs, that “impact” should not 
only cover intended but also unintended 
consequences of the intervention, that 
sustainability should not only be considered for 
the future but also for the past, etc. You are 
perfectly right. But rest assured, I will address 
those aspects later in these comments. But let us 
clear up the terminological jungle first and 
assume common conventions on terminology! 
As far as the main substance of the task 
force’s conclusions goes, I perfectly agree. But 
this substance is not new and was developed in 
the mid-eighties by the European Commission’s 
Evaluation Division of Directorates General 
VIII and I, headed by me at the time. The 
results of that work are contained in the 
“Manual of Project Cycle Management (PCM), 
Integrated Approach and Logical Framework, 
February 1993.” This manual has been 
translated into all of the official languages then 
in use within the European Union and has been 
distributed in many thousands of copies all over 
the world, including through the World Bank 
and UNDP. The approach, and more 
particularly its “Basic Format,” (BF) were 
conceived on the basis of the relevant 
documentation of all of the members of the DAC. 
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This means that it is based on thousands of 
years of experience, counted in “expert-years.” 
So, one would expect that there is really not 
much of real importance that has been left out. 
And indeed, all of the important issues raised by 
the WMU task force, ranging from needs 
assessment to government policies, etc., are 
included in the BF. I invite the task force to 
look at the catalogue of the additions to the five 
fundamental DAC criteria they propose and 
then cross them out, one by one, as they find 
the same criteria already included in the PCM 
BF. To their surprise, they will find that there 
are virtually none left on their list. Here is the 
updated version that entirely preserves the 1993 
substance of the Basic Format, containing all of 
the criteria considered important by the DAC 
Evaluation Working Party. As can be seen, the 
Basic Format contains, almost verbatim, all of 
the suggestions formulated by the task force. 
The importance of nonmonetary cost, however, 
as underlined by the task force with convincing 
reasons, should be included in the BF, as I have 
done, inserting the parenthesis under BF point 
5.4. The taskforce is also right, I think, in 
stressing the need to consider alternatives to the 
solution chosen by an intervention, and I have 
therefore inserted a new point 3.5.: “Alternative 
solutions.” Further improvements, following 
arguments by the task force, concern BF points 
5.2. and 6.6 (see the last two paragraphs on the 
following page).  
 




 2.1 Government/sectoral policy - donor 
policy coherence/complementarity - 
      democracy - human rights - good 
governance 
 2.2. Features of sector 
 2.3. Beneficiaries and other stakeholders 
2.4. Problems and opportunities to be 
addressed (Relevance) 
2.5. Other interventions, cooperation with 
other donors, past best practice 
2.6  Documents available  
2.7 Project/program history, including past, 
present and future application of PCM 
3. Intervention (intended and unintended 
results) 
 3.1. Overall objectives (Impact) 
3.2. Outcome: Project/program purpose 
(Effectiveness) 
 3.3. Outputs (Efficiency) 
 3.4. Inputs and activities (Economy) 
 3.5 Alternative solutions 
4. Assumptions 
4.1. Assumptions at different intervention 
levels 
 4.2. Risks and flexibility 
5. Implementation 
 5.1. Physical and nonphysical means 
5.2. Organization - procedures -  
transparency - ethicality  
 5.3. Timetable 
5.4. Cost estimate (including nonmonetary 
costs) and financing plan 
5.5. Special conditions: accompanying 
measures taken by government 
6. Quality Factors ensuring Sustainability 
 6.1. Policy support 
 6.2. Appropriate technology 
6.3. Environmental protection - climate 
change 
6.4. Sociocultural aspects: Gender issues -  
     participation - empowerment - ownership 
 6.5. Institutional and management capacity, 
public and private; decentralization of 
responsibilities; subsidiarity  
 6.6 Innovations 
7. Economic and financial viability 
8. Monitoring and evaluation 
 8.1. Monitoring plan and indicators 
 8.2. Reviews/evaluations 
9. Conclusions and proposals  (including overall 
sustainability assessment) 
 
But there remain other important points 
raised under the conclusions of the task force, 
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alluded previously: Goals (better: “outcomes”) 
as compared with needs and future as compared 
to past sustainability, etc. The solution of these 
problems becomes self evident the minute one 
understands the following: 
 
(a) Evaluation and planning should be 
amalgamated, following the same 
structure: that of the Basic Format 
above. 
(b) Evaluation considers exclusively the 
past and planning exclusively the future; 
(c) Planning and evaluation pursue a 
common objective: the creation of 
sustainable benefits for the target 
groups of international development 
cooperation (IDC).  
 
When planning, i.e., trying to predict the 
future, one should, according to point 2.4 of the 
Basic Format, analyze the problems and the 
opportunities of the target group and then 
address these under the “Intervention” points 
listed under point 3 of the BF. Of course, 
planners will only have one outcome 
(unfortunately called “impact” by the task force) 
in mind to be worked for: the one covering the 
problems and opportunities, i.e., the “needs,” of 
the target group as recognized by planners. 
Planners, having long ago been warned by 
evaluators, will be familiar with the danger of 
producing undesired outcomes and impacts and 
will try to avoid these. So, they will try to match 
exactly the needs to be covered by the outcome 
anticipated. Similarly, planners will anticipate 
the most probable sustainability scenario and 
plan the intervention accordingly. So, it is 
perfectly normal as well as desirable that 
planners should have one, and only one, 
scenario in mind when planning for each of the 
points contained in the BF. They simply cannot, 
and should not, do otherwise. Not so 
evaluators: Evaluators have the tremendous 
advantage of looking at facts, not just desires, 
because they analyze the past using, however, 
the same guide planners do: the BF. So, if needs 
are not covered by the intervention as they 
should have been or, worse, if important needs 
have been overlooked by planners, evaluators 
will draw planners’ attention to this fact. If 
planned outcomes and impacts seem unrealistic 
or exaggerated in light of actual experience, 
evaluators will draw planners’ attention to that 
probability. Planners may then be in a position 
to redress, even if only partly, the situation 
concerning the current intervention and learn 
what to do and what to avoid in future similar 
interventions. Corresponding considerations 
hold concerning sustainability, past and future. 
In other words, evaluators will never judge the 
success of an intervention just by comparing 
planned outcomes with outcomes realized. They 
will never judge sustainability just by analyzing 
planners’ intentions. They will be looking at the 
facts; have past needs, past sustainability, past 
intended and unintended impacts in mind; and 
formulate their recommendations for future 
interventions on that basis. 
The taskforce further proposes that what 
they call two missing key criteria should be 
added: (a) “quality of process” and (b) 
“exportability” of innovative ideas. Both are 
important aspects, but I don’t think that they 
should be integrated into the planning and 
evaluation systems on the same level as the 
other five classical DAC criteria. As to (a), I 
fully agree that ethicality and environmental 
responsibility are important. However, 
environmental responsibility is already 
contained in the BF. As to ethicality, there is no 
doubt as to its significance, and so it does 
deserve serious consideration. But, again, it 
should not be a stand-alone criterion, but 
should be fitted into a logical system of 
planning and evaluation and can thus find its 
place within the BF under its point 5.2., which 
would become “5.2. Organization – procedures 
– transparency – ethicality.” Similarly, “best 
practice” experience as pioneered elsewhere in 
the development cooperation community 
deserves a special mention under point 2.5 of 
the BF, which would thus become “Other 
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interventions, cooperation with other donors, 
best practice.”  All other aspects mentioned by 
Chianca are already contained in the BF. 
 Turning to “exportability,” it would be 
rather confusing to maintain this term as such. 
Planners would, quite understandably, have no 
use for this term as they cannot be sure which 
parts of interventions planned by them will 
eventually be recognized, by evaluators, as 
useful for other planners in different 
circumstances, i.e., as “exportable.” It may, 
however, be useful that planners indicate those 
products, measures, and procedures that they 
think will be innovative and then leave it to 
evaluators to arrive at a final judgment. If so, 
one could think of a new category in the BF, 
under point 6.6.: “Innovations.” In any case, I 
would strongly advise against a term like 
“exportability,” since it is confusing and will 
incite people to think of foreign trade or other 
nonsense issues. All other aspects mentioned 
under “exportability” in the article, including 
those applied by ALNAP, have already been 
part of the BF for many years. 
I have thus made sure that the entire 
additional substance as contributed by the 
taskforce to the DAC evaluation (and, let me 
add, planning) criteria are incorporated into the 
BF. These additions are useful and important, 
and it is only normal that the BF, 
notwithstanding its being backed up by solid 
international experience during several decades, 
should come constantly under critical review 
and be improved accordingly. So, thank you, 
task force, for your positive contribution and 
keep questioning and improving DAC and 
other criteria (as well as your own)! Turning to 
this last mentioned issue (in parentheses), may I 
point out that the DAC criteria as reinterpreted 
and completed by the task force still fall far 
short of the optimum solution: 
 
(a) There are numerous important aspects 
that are indispensable for good planning 
and evaluation but that the task force 
fails to include. I leave it to the task 
force to work out, on the basis of the 
BF, the list of these missing factors. 
(b) The task force does not realize that it is 
vital to establish these criteria not only 
for evaluation but also for planning; if, 
indeed, such amalgamation of planning 
and evaluation is neglected, feedback of 
lessons learned will remain the thorny 
problem it has always been, forgetting 
proceeding at the same pace as learning, 
with the result that the same deplorable 
planning and evaluation quality in 
international development cooperation 
persists. If such, “built-in” forgetting is 
to be avoided, learning must be 
systematically integrated into the 
planning and evaluation structure as 
contained in the BF and, feathering out 
into further and further refinements, in 
Basic Formats per sector, per cross-
cutting theme, per instrument, thus 
leading eventually (and after further 
refinements through “regionalization”), 
to the final level: the case-by-case 
“Terms of Reference” for planning and 
evaluation. All of this material would be 
integrated into and permanently 
upgraded within the “PCM Database.”  
 
Placing a “bar,” i.e., a “minimum acceptable 
level of performance” (p. 49) on each criterion, 
as proposed by Chianca, seems an excellent idea 
to me and a real improvement of the PCM 
approach. Anchoring such bars within the PCM 
Database appears to be a straightforward, 
perfectly feasible procedure. Including 
“relevance” in the “barring” procedure seems to 
me a particularly pertinent idea. Indeed, the 
backward-looking evaluation function begins 
the moment after the start of planning, i.e., 
without waiting for damage to be done by 
planners on the basis of, say, an erroneous 
needs assessment. 
I also fully agree with Chianca when he 
pleads in favour of “weighing” the criteria, i.e., 
establishing a hierarchy among them. We 
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further agree on the most important among the 
criteria, the bedrock of the entire system. He 
writes, “Whether the aid intervention is 
producing meaningful changes in people’s lives . 
. . places the impact criterion on a possible 
superior position in terms of importance” (p. 
50). I only think that there is one superfluous 
and confusing word in this sentence, and that’s 
“possible.” I also have my doubts as to the term 
“impact” in the above context (see paragraph 
concerning terminology below). But these 
points are of minor significance only. 
Indeed, the entire international development 
cooperation enterprise has one single objective: 
the creation of sustainable benefits for the 
target group. This is what planning and 
evaluation are all about. Let us not be 
sidetracked by confusing statements of 
stakeholders sitting on the sidelines and seeking 
their own advantage. Of course, corruption, 
politicians’ and civil servants’ hidden agendas, 
power plays along the aid delivery line and so 
on, will always be there. But nobody will ever 
say that they don’t care for the intended 
beneficiaries, the “target group,” the final 
delivery station of all aid and all cooperation 
effort! They can’t without losing face! And that 
is what the international development 
community should nail them down to! It will 
make cheating a really hard business for them! 
Before pursuing to formulate further 
considerations on substantive issues, I should 
like to make a few observations on terminology. 
Terminology is a matter of convention and 
practice. It does not have any “value” 
whatsoever as such. We can say peuple, volk, 
pueblo, popolo or people, always meaning the 
same subject. None of these expressions is 
better than the other. What’s important, 
however, is that those who use these 
expressions and those who listen to them know 
what they are talking about. So, if everyone 
understands the same thing when talking about 
“impact,” that would be OK. Unfortunately, 
that is not the case. Traditionally, “impact” has 
always covered, in classical Logical Framework 
Analysis (LFA), the contribution of a project or 
program towards the realization of a higher-
level policy goal. Why change? But if we do, 
let’s do it all together, while not forgetting that 
it is of substantial, not just formal, importance 
to cover the entire substance between inputs 
and policy goal achievement. If we define, as 
does Chianca, “impact” as covering the creation 
of sustainable benefits for the target group 
called “outcome” in LFA, then we would have 
not only two but, together with “purpose” and 
“specific objective,” four expressions for 
“outcome” and none for covering the 
contribution of a project/program towards the 
realization of wider policy objectives. That’s no 
advantage, is it? It’s ridiculous! We might just as 
well decide to eliminate the expression “fire” (as 
sounding too dangerous) and replace it by the 
expression “water-minus.” 
Last but not least, no, last but most 
important of all, there is the question of the 
practical realization of Chianca’s proposals: He 
says that “if followed,” the changes proposed 
“could contribute for increasing the quality of 
evaluations for the purpose of (re)funding, 
program changes, and other decision options” 
(p. 41). I take this to mean more success in 
international development cooperation in terms of 
creating sustainable benefits for target groups of IDC. I 
agree. So, let us have a hard look at that fateful: 
IF FOLLOWED! 
Chianca pleads in favour of the old saying 
“first things first,” and who would not agree? 
Publishing this article is a first step. But we all 
know that this publication won’t be sufficient to 
cause even so much as a tiny start in improving 
the quality of IDC. How many of the people 
who should will read this article? A tiny 
minority. And how many of those will want to 
have a serious go at improving IDC? Again, a 
tiny minority of that tiny minority. So, we may 
safely replace the “IF” by “NOT” if things 
don’t go beyond this publication. Chianca will 
certainly agree with this statement as he does 
not hesitate to affirm that “it would be naive to 
think that just because we have an improved set 
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of criteria, evaluations in the field of 
international aid will improve accordingly” (p. 
50). I agree. Not only would it be naive, it 
would be downright stupid. But let us assume 
that, by a magic trick performed by the 
development fairy, evaluations would, indeed, 
become better because of more pertinent 
criteria. Would that improve, in itself, the 
success of IDC? Not one bit! Again, we would 
need the magic trick by the development fairy 
so as to induce planners, implementers and 
intended beneficiaries to apply the lessons 
learned through those improved evaluations. 
And as forgetting proceeds at the same pace as 
leaning, planners, implementers and 
beneficiaries, by and large, don’t apply those 
lessons, and thus do no better jobs than they 
used to, and IDC remains of the same shaky 
quality today as it has always been. So, there’s 
no light at the end of the tunnel, and that is 
indeed what many critics of IDC affirm. If they 
are right, we might just as well give up. But that 
is precisely what we are NOT going to do. 
Paul Clements (2008) goes considerably 
beyond those “first-things-first” steps when 
proposing measures with a view to improving 
IDC evaluations. He suggests (a) concentration 
on two evaluation criteria: cost effectiveness 
and impact; and (b) an organizational approach 
to ensure an appropriate back-up to such 
improvement via the creation of what he calls 
“Evaluation International” (EI). Thus, he and 
Chianca underline the need to ensure a 
privileged position for “impact,” understood as 
the positive change in living standards of the 
target group to be brought about by the 
development intervention considered. I fully 
agree, being certain that one can easily come to 
an understanding concerning the terminological 
issues discussed above. But I do not believe that 
these suggestions, if realized, will bring about 
the necessary change in the quality of IDC (see 
previous paragraph). I believe that we should go 
beyond these proposals in order to arrive at 
operational results as measured in terms of 
sustainable benefits for the target groups of 
IDC. So, what seems necessary to construct that 
all-important bridge between theory and 
practice? 
First of all, evaluators should give up talking 
of evaluation only and considering themselves 
“bande à part” (as the French would put it). 
Evaluators have always had that nasty tendency 
to keep themselves to themselves. Time and 
again, they have invented, modified, reinvented, 
and modified again, the structure of evaluations. 
In doing this, they have made it very difficult 
indeed to do what would have been, and what 
continues to be, the only justification of their 
efforts: contribute, together with planners, 
implementers/monitors and users (i.e., all the 
other stakeholders), to the creation of 
sustainable benefits for IDC target groups. It is 
time for evaluators to join the team and adhere, 
together with all the others, to a common 
fundamental structure, based on solid 
experience, for evaluation and planning alike, to 
be kept under review and to be continually 
improved by all. The PCM Basic Format is such 
a structure. Planners and implementers should 
apply that structure prospectively, evaluators 
and monitors retrospectively. 
Next, all involved should agree on the 
“centre of gravity” of the entire system. Chianca 
proposes “impact,” Clements “impact” and 
“cost-effectiveness,” I agree with both as far as 
the concentration on “impact” is concerned (I 
would, let me repeat, call it “outcome,” 
“project/program purpose” or “specific 
objective”). Indeed, the “centre of gravity” 
should be one and one only. It seems easy 
enough to define “impact” (meaning what I 
have called “outcome”) in such a way that all of 
the other criteria will contribute to its 
realization, including “cost-effectiveness” 
which, in the hierarchy of criteria (Chianca) 
must range below “impact” (= “outcome”). 
Such concentration on the one objective that 
encompasses all the others and that, moreover, 
everyone can understand is, in my view, 
absolutely essential if we want to cross that all-
important bridge between theory and practice. 
Hellmut W. Eggers 




And when I say “we,” I mean the entire 
development cooperation community, including 
not only politicians, administrators, technicians, 
planners, and evaluators, but also taxpayers and 
farmers in developing countries, no matter 
whether or not they know how to read and to 
write (there are even some taxpayers around 
who don’t). A farmer in Mali will scratch his 
head when asked what the ERR of an 
intervention might be, but he will know 
immediately what he would consider a good 
well: one that will provide enough drinking 
water for his family, himself and his livestock 
for many years (and that’s SBTG!). 
The deplorable quality of IDC evaluations is 
not only the result of haphazard structuring, but 
also their failure to produce operational 
feedback, i.e., their lack of integration into the 
planning cycle. As shown above, this weakness 
can and should be overcome by adopting a 
single structure for planning and evaluation, 
represented by the Basic Format. The BF 
should be accompanied by a more detailed 
commentary covering each of its different 
points. For each major development sector 
(agriculture, industry, education, public health 
etc.), different sector BFs should be established, 
and these should be adapted to the specific 
conditions prevailing in each country/region. 
Furthermore, the BF should be adapted to 
specific development instruments, like structural 
adjustments, direct budget support, etc., again 
subsequently to be regionalized. It should also 
be adapted to crosscutting themes, like gender 
issues, environmental questions, organizational 
problems, etc. Finally, the specific terms of 
reference for each intervention should be 
established ad hoc following, however, the BF 
structure. This entire, voluminous 
documentation, the PCM Database, should 
constantly be kept under review, and new 
insights gained by evaluations can thus 
immediately be integrated into the system. 
Learning, instead of being systematically 
forgotten, will never be lost and will be made 
available automatically to the planning and 
implementation of new interventions. 
Comparisons, as everyone knows, never 
cover the entire substance of the reality they are 
referring to. They cannot be “scientific.” They 
can, however, fire the imagination and stimulate 
creative thought. Here, then, is a comparison 
referring to the system as outlined in the 
previous paragraph: The BF is like the DNA of 
the model “organism” we are dealing with when 
talking of projects, programs, policies, sectors, 
crosscutting themes, instruments, etc. It 
represents the fundamental structure of all these 
different organisms: they all have heads, spines, 
blood vessels, and so on. They are released into 
the world and interact with it and with each 
other. They are challenged by their environment 
and “evaluated” over and over again. Changes 
in their genomes will allow them to react and 
adapt to these challenges. They will be 
“improved” and “redesigned,” ever so gently 
and progressively, thus increasing their survival 
chances. Planning and evaluation, constantly 
renewed along their life cycles, will mould these 
organisms into shapes and forms that improve 
their survival chances and make them 
“sustainable.” Adaptations to local 
circumstances and pressures will proceed 
relatively quickly, but changes in the master-
mould, the Basic Format, will be rare, and if 
they occur, they will have been thoroughly 
tested by real-life circumstances. Information 
contained in DNA’s vast database, gathered and 
constantly renewed during the life cycles of 
many generations, will thus be kept up-to-date 
and will constantly guide the emergence of new 
and better adapted forms of life. 
I will not overstretch that comparison so as 
not to overstep the limits of the ridiculous, but I 
will point out, nevertheless, that the “evolution” 
as traced above has to be kept moving by a 
source of steadily renewed energy, and that is 
where Evaluation International as proposed by 
Clements comes into play. The need for the 
creation of this office had never crossed my 
mind, but after reflecting on the issue this 
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requirement now seems quite obvious to me. 
Such is the result of teamwork. Clements 
favours more of a formal, norm-setting 
structure, while I think one should rely on a less 
rigorously structured, more consensus- and 
persuasion-oriented central “secretariat.” It is 
not necessary, however, to decide this question 
right now. Applying Chianca’s “first-things- 
first” motto, here is what I should like to 
propose as a first step: 
The task force, supported by Chianca and 
Clements, should draft a “strategy” or, better 
still because less pretentious, an “orientation 
paper” containing, on some ten to twelve pages, 
three main sections: (a) Reasons for the 
insufficient quality of evaluations in IDC; (b) 
what to do to improve the situation by (i) 
creating a system of operational feedback-
oriented evaluation, (ii) organizing a 
coordinating EI unit, and (iii) selecting a series 
of contact organizations that would be invited 
to critically review the proposals under (i) and 
(ii) and then enter into an international network, 
allowing to run the system and to constantly 
improve its effectiveness. I could help with 
establishing the terms of reference of the 
orientation paper and with reviewing its draft 
version prior to the formulation of the final 
version. 
 These are, then, my observations whose 
formulation was prompted by the study of 
Chianca’s article, together with that of previous 
writings by Clements. I have read these 
contributions with lively interest, and I had to 
correct some of my views in their light, while 
incorporating a series of suggestions contained 
in them into the PCM system. Maintaining a 
healthy mistrust as to one’s own opinions is 
always conducive to progress, I think, and I 
hope that my correspondents hold similar 
convictions. This attitude is, I know from 
experience, a perfect means to avoid losing face. 
If one doesn’t lose face, one will not lose faith; 
and if one doesn’t lose faith, one will have a real 
chance to become a Whynot instead of a 
Yesbut. You don’t know what that is? Then 
turn to the “Evaluation Poetry” as published in 
JMDE volume 4, issue 7 (Eggers, 2007). We, a 
handful of people in a frail sailing vessel, are 
trying to nudge an ocean liner into course 
correction, you say? That’s right. Chances to 
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